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“Given a dark room and a highly motivated subject, one has no difficulty in demonstrating Korte’s Laws of
phenomenal movement. Lead the subject from the dark room to the market place and then find out what
it is he sees moving and under what conditions, and Korte’s Laws, though still valid, describe the situation
about as well as the Laws of Color Mixture describe one’s feelings before an El Greco canvas.”
Bruner and Goodman (1947, p. 33)
INTRODUCTION
Macrocognition research is concerned with cognitive processing in complex environments,
goal-oriented action, goal combination and competition, cognitive-affective and cognitive-social
interactions, distributed processing, and situatedness. These interests are critical to the theoretical
modeling of cognitive systems for at least two reasons: (1) complexity is pervasive (and generally
increases from laboratory to daily life situations), and (2) efforts are needed within (and across)
all scientific fields to give meaning to, and a more global picture of, usually separate(d) knowledge
fields.
In the present paper, and exactly for these two same reasons, we examine the status of
“macrocognition” and suggest that epistemologically, “macrocognition” should not be regarded
as different from other forms of cognition, including what has been called “microcognition”
(Clark, 1989). Microcognition usually refers to more “internal,” “subpersonal” determinants of
cognitive processing (e.g., neuronal activity involved in visual perception). However, in contrast
to what is sometimes found in the macrocognition literature, we do not consider microcognition
as a set of “invariant” processes or “building blocks” of cognition (Letsky and Warner, 2008,
p. 9). Rather, we propose here that complexity and dynamics characterize both macrocognition
and microcognition. Moreover, macrocognition cannot “shunt” microcognition. Rather than
promoting a new functionalism at the macroscale, we recommend that a more unitary, multiscale1
approach to cognition be developed. Human cognition is complex and distributed, as is the
biological network on which it relies. We suggest studying the generic properties of cognition
through flexible analysis scales rather than creating specific fields or categories of cognition as a
function of the scale of interest. In the following lines, we rely on a multiscale model of perception-
action cycles’ emergence, theMultiscale EnactionModel (MEM; Laurent, 2014), in which context is
conceived of as being both multiple and multiscale. First, this model allows us to consider multiple
interactions between processes, in line with macrocognition research’s aims. Second, it highlights
1By using the term “multiscale,” we refer tomultiple levels of observation and analysis (e.g., cellular, individual, social).
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the need to flexibly conceive cognitive interactions at multiple
scales and to reunite cognition and aims, including basic,
embodied physiological goals (e.g., hydration, energy
recompletion), which do not need to be consciously
elaborated.
WHY COGNITION CAN BE
“MACROCOGNITION”
The term “macrocognition” can refer to at least two perspectives
over cognition. The first perspective characterizes augmented
cognition theories and stresses the role of informational
complexity and distributed or extended cognition. It can be
opposed to more elementary views on information processing
and to analytical research strategies. Macroscale factors (e.g.,
socioeconomical position of a family) can changemicrocognition
(e.g., object size estimation) even in laboratory settings (Bruner
and Goodman, 1947). This point is important for later discussion
presented in our paper, because microcognition can neither
be viewed as isolated from large-scale influences (limits
of experimental-analytic approaches to cognition) nor be
considered as fixed or as a set of “invariable building blocks”
of cognition (limits of some macrocognition approaches,
discussed later). Therefore, cognition rather appears to
be enacted through interactions relating microscopic and
macroscopic levels, such that a rupture between micro and
macroscale analyses does not seem to be epistemologically
sound.
The second perspective is related to the nature of the
cognitive determinants that are valued, with the prefix “macro”
referring to relatively large-scale influences (e.g., cognitive-
social interactions), as opposed to more regional mutual
influences (e.g., neuro–neuronal interactions). In this perspective
“macrocognition” is often seen as being more “ecologically
valid,” or as enhancing “external validity” because it focuses
on wide-range interactions that can be encountered in daily
situations:
“Macrocognition is a term coined by Pietro Cacciabue and Erik
Hollnagel to indicate a level of description of cognitive functions
that are performed in natural (versus artificial laboratory) decision-
making settings [...] the methodology for macrocognition focuses on
the world outside the lab. This includes contexts designated by such
terms as the ‘field setting’, the ‘natural laboratory’, and the ‘real
world.”’
(Klein et al., 2003, p. 81)
We are sympathetic with the view that cognition is embedded
in a network of contextual influences (i.e., the first perspective),
but we anticipate limitations to the second view, which
may imply a new reductionist functionalism—a large-
scale equivalent to functionalist views over microcognition.
Indeed, there is no pre-set, well-suited scale of analysis. As
complexity is pervasive and multiscale, the scale at which
processes should be described has to be flexible rather than
fixed.
WHY MACROCOGNITION CANNOT SHUNT
MICROCOGNITION: FROM EXOGENOUS
TO ENDOGENOUS COMPLEXITY
The term “macrocognition” usefully highlights the need for
a larger scope of analysis than the one characterizing most
laboratory-based experiments. However, what is usually thought
of as an “external” or “environmental” factor actually combines
with the organism state so that one cannot exclude any term
of the interaction at any single moment. The activity of any
part of an organism depends on the activity of the other
parts to which it is linked. For instance, even when social-
environmental complexity related to the task at hand is high
(e.g., real-world lottery), factors affecting low-level biological
parameters (such as ambient temperature, Cheema and Patrick,
2012) can have impacts over cognition (e.g., consumer choice).
The internal resource dynamics (e.g., related to hydration)
changes the willingness to make difficult gambles. Furthermore, a
great amount of social psychology research, which is supposed to
capture social complexity, is grounded in self-reported measures
and individual interpretation of external complexity. In order to
produce self-reports, internal construction of what is reported is a
prerequisite to data communication and processing; this internal
construction involves microscale activity (e.g., at the cellular
level).
There is no macroscopic-level influence on behavior without
(a) prior biological or psychological integration of the values
associated with the factors of influence and (b) competition
between and/or combination with the current goals and needs
of the organism. Failing to recognize the complex nature of
the phenomena constituting a human being can give rise to
reductionism, be at the microscale or at the macroscale level.
From this standpoint, suprapersonal (e.g., social), personal, and
subpersonal (e.g., cellular), levels of analysis should meet. The
terms “suprapersonal” and “subpersonal” refer to different scale
levels in the analysis of cognition but do not imply an opposition
between complexity and simplicity. Suprapersonal factors (e.g.,
social influences) are currently more easily detectable from a
macroscale level of analysis whereas “subpersonal” factors (e.g.,
genetic influences) are currently more easily observable from a
microscale level of analysis. However, considering one as being
complex and the other one as being elementary and invariant
would be misleading. For instance, one cannot pretend that
“genetic” determinants of cognition do not involve a wealth
of interacting mechanisms that influence each other (see Flint,
1999; Hill et al., 2014). In the following lines, we suggest that
macrocognition and microcognition should be conceived within
a single epistemological framework.
WHY MACROCOGNITION DOES NOT
EPISTEMOLOGICALLY DIFFER FROM
MICROCOGNITION IN THE MULTISCALE
ENACTION MODEL
Enactive systems produce information and knowledge by acting
in their environment. In MEM (Laurent, 2014), each cell is
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conceived as an autopoietic structure2 which tends to optimize
its own functioning by interacting with other cells or groups of
cells. Perception-action cycles in MEM rely on those interactions
because what is searched for in the environment depends on
internal needs and goals. Internal needs and goals can be
described at different scales. Any “external” or “ecological”
influence over behavior is a transaction between embodied
personal history (i.e., the current mode of coupling between
the organism and its environment, subsequent to previous
evolution and learning), goals, needs or orientations and external
stimulation. Put differently, macrocognition cannot be correctly
thought of without describing the interactions between the
current biological state and motivation of the organism on the
one hand and macroscale stimulation on the other hand.
Distributed cognition is pervasive, not only at the subpersonal
level, but also at the suprapersonal level (e.g., networks of
interacting individuals). There should be no epistemological
rupture in the conception of distributed cognition, at physical,
biological, and psychological levels. Huebner (2014) reviewed
many studies suggesting that collective performance strongly
depends on the coordinative properties of couples or groups,
such that the collective performance cannot be reduced to
the sum of individual performances. Interestingly, cognitive
distribution and coordinative patterns are fundamental emerging
features of groups of cells within neural networks (Craddock
et al., 2013), brain areas (Bressler and Menon, 2010), and human
groups (Goldstone et al., 2008). At any level, the distribution of
cognition allows for the sharing of the informational load the
organism is dealing with and the generation of new information
through exchanges between the organism’s parts. In MEM, a
multiscale unifying principle is hypothesized within the central
nervous system, which relates external and internal events to the
organism’s goals, such that both macro and microscale influences
combine and are weighted as a function of their value for the
organism. In MEM, the interactions between needs and goals
(considered from the cellular to the psychosocial and economic
levels3) and perception-action cycles are basic foundations for
2The Autopoiesis refers to self-production and maintenance of a “systemic
variable”; an autopoietic system is a “homeostat” in which “the critical variable
is the system’s own organization” (Stafford Beer, Preface of Autopoiesis, The
Organization of the Living, In Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 66).
“An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity)
as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction)
of components that produces the components which: (i) through their
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the
machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components)
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a
network.”
(Maturana and Varela, 1980, pp. 78–79)
3Even if our view may be different from Maturana’s regarding goals and needs,
we completely agree with him when he considers that a similar organization can
be found in many different structures: “any given organization may be realized
through many different structures, and [...] different subsets or relations included
in the structure of a given entity, may be abstracted by an observer [...] as
organizations that define different classes of composite unities (Maturana, 1980,
p. XX). For more information about biocomputational bases for goal and need
summations, see Laurent (2014).
resource allocation given the limitations in time and processing
power. According to the model, teleological4 dimensions of
activity arise from the combination of need expression at the
cellular and the cell network levels, and spread out to the
organism and phenomenological experience through diffusion,
competition, and cooperation. In this conception, the goal-
directed nature of cognition makes it critical to capture any kind
of influence that can modify the organism’s goals. In this sense,
any macroscopic-level factor should be put in the context of
the organism state, as—in the other way round—the organism’s
informational processing and behavior should be considered in
the context of larger environmental influences. In other words,
in a radically distributed cognitive framework, distribution has no
pre-set scale of analysis. Rather, distribution should be considered
in every network that allows for information exchange and
influences need/goal/aim satisfaction or frustration, be at cellular,
cognitive, or social-affective levels. By relating micro and
macroscale information integration to internal goals and needs,
this multiscale approach provides us with tools to reunite macro
and microscopic processes and levels of analysis.
SCALE FLEXIBILITY IN DISTRIBUTED
COGNITION RESEARCH: ENDING UP
WITH THE BLIND SPOT OF
“MACROCOGNITION RESEARCH”
“What is a thing at one level may be relations among (different)
things at another.”
(Kelso, 1995, p. 97)
Though we subscribe to the macrocognition perspective for its
emphasis on complexity, we warn the reader against the risks
associated with a fixed-scale approach to cognition. Because
macrocognition researchers stress the role of complexity, they
should develop scale flexibility in their analyses. Even what is
referred to as “macrocognition” by some researchers working
on emotional context of behavior is identified as microscopic
by others working on social networks. This does not change
anything to the fact that, in order to analyze complex behaviors,
we need to contextualize them. As a function of the scale of
analysis, what can be considered a “context” varies.
Arguably what should be regarded as “ecologically valid” is
the capture of multiscale interactions in experimental—or, more
largely, empirical—settings that are found in everyday situations
(rather than simply macroscale interactions). On those bases,
and following what we discussed earlier, neglecting microscopic
factors may be as harmful as neglecting macroscopic factors. In
any instance of fixed-scale analysis, cognition is most probably
regarded as a set of “functions” that process information under
the influence of a limited number of “causes.”
We invite the reader to pay attention to a blind spot that
we have identified in the literature on macrocognition. The
“macrocognition research blind spot” consists in associating
“emergence,” “dynamics” and “complexity” with macrocognition
4As used here, the term “teleological” does not refer to any form of metaphysical
finalism.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1123
Laurent and Bianchi The MEM Lens
as opposed to “invariant processes” or “building blocks”
of cognition, which would be identified by microcognition
research (Klein et al., 2003). We consider this distinction
misleading. As discussed earlier in this paper, microcognition
is also emergent, complex, and dynamic (Laurent, 2014).
Distinguishing micro from macrocognition research on the basis
of emergence, complexity, and dynamics (or “reality”) is neither
empirically nor theoretically or logically founded. The problems
associated with mainstream cognitive psychology/science (e.g.,
poor consideration for emergence, analytic approaches, lack of
dynamic frameworks) should not be confused with the issue of
the scale (i.e., micro, macro) at which the analysis is performed.
Relatedly, we do not adhere to the recurrent statements (or
judgements) found in the Macrocognition literature on what
“reality” is:
“Microcognition relinquishes the coupling between the
phenomenon and the real context to the advantage of the
coupling with the underlying theory or model.”
(Cacciabue and Hollnagel, 1995, p. 57)
We rather call for a true contextual relativism where factors
such as hydration level, laboratory settings, “internal”
biological disorders, or mood fluctuations are as real as (i)
the biomechanical constraints, goals, prescriptions, machines,
pervasive information systems, and social context surrounding
task realization and (ii) the parameters to be coordinated, which
participate in emerging cognition and behaviors.
If macrocognition is to become a reference framework for the
cognitive science of embedded agents, then the contexts under
scrutiny should be flexibly defined, and their role theoretically
reconstructed and empirically tested.
We hope that researchers interested in complexity will
not add a new scale to functionalism. In other words,
macrocognition should not exclude microcognition. As put
by Minsky (1988), “each higher level of description must add
to our knowledge about lower levels, rather than replace it”
(p. 26). We note that this addition of knowledge should not
be merely scale-specific. Rather, it should involve working on
the interactions between different scales and reporting what
identifies/differentiates distributed cognition at different scales.
This is a basic condition to approach behavioral complexity
and to develop more unitary frameworks in psychology and life
sciences.
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